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Abstract 
The number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China has 
increased dramatically in recent years. Under China’s “go global” strategy, Chinese 
firms are devoting more capital and time to developing their overseas business. 
Cross-border M&As make up a large proportion of these activities. Therefore, it is 
crucial to determine what factors affect the performance of cross-border 
acquisitions. 
Previous studies show that the post-merger performance of the acquirer is 
affected by various factors. Those papers mainly focus on domestic M&As. 
However, cross-border M&As also have unique features. In this study, I focus on 
Chinese cross-border acquisitions and the factors that affect the acquirers’ post-
merger performance. I start my research with a few case studies. I analyze Chinese 
cross-border acquisition deals and compare them with U.S. deals. In addition, I 
examine one domestic acquisition of a Chinese corporation and compare it with 
cross-border acquisitions conducted by Chinese acquirers. I find that post-merger 
integration for cross-border acquisitions faces more issues than that for domestic 
acquisitions. Through the case analysis, I identify two factors that are crucial to the 
post-merger performance of the acquirer. These two factors are due diligence and 
cultural conflicts. In the second part of my study, I conduct a series of empirical 
analyses. I use two proxies that are highly correlated with the due diligence process 
and culture conflicts to examine their impact on post-merger performance. I 
manually match data on Chinese cross-border deals from the Securities Data 
Company database to data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
database. The empirical results show that acquirers’ overseas experience is 
associated with better post-merger performance and market reactions. Moreover, 
the deal characteristics differ between targets incorporated in developed and 
developing countries. However, long-term post-merger performance does not vary 
with the target incorporated nation. To conclude, my study shows that firms 
undertaking cross-border acquisitions need to conduct thorough due diligence and 
pay more attention to post-merger integration. Although the market might have 
different reactions to the acquisitions of firms incorporated in different countries, 
long-term performance is not affected by the target’s nationality.
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, the number of Chinese firms conducting cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has increased dramatically. The process of 
Chinese cross-border acquisition has also experienced rapid development during 
these years, with a few key stages. Before 2000, cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions were not the usual channels for firms’ expansion, which might have 
been due to factors such as insufficient financing channels and inadequate laws and 
regulations. However, in 2008, cross-border M&As entered an exploratory stage 
that lasted until 2013. The global financial crisis in 2008 decreased the value of 
some high-quality foreign companies, providing excellent opportunities for 
Chinese companies to expand overseas. Meanwhile, China’s “going out” strategy 
gave companies more incentives and support to make investment overseas, which 
started a new merger wave across the nation. The next stage was from 2014 to 2016, 
as more listed companies participated in overseas acquisitions. In addition, as the 
RMB entered its depreciation cycle, the demand for global asset allocation by 
enterprises increased. The “Made in China 2025” industry upgrade, “Belt and Road 
Initiative,” and consumption upgrade demand proposed by the Chinese government 
jointly promoted the transformation of the M&A target industry. The final stage of 
cross-border M&A development began in 2017 when the government started to 
promote cross-border M&As and started to regulate firms’ acquisition activities. 
Cross-border M&As represent an important channel for firms to obtain 
technologies, enter new markets, and increase their size. Studies show that as in 
domestic acquisitions, firms’ long-run performance is affected by the outcomes of 
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M&As (Chavaltanpipat et al., 1999; Spyrou & Siougle, 2007). Therefore, the 
performance of firms’ cross-border acquisitions is crucial to the wealth of the firms’ 
shareholders. In this paper, I analyze the factors that affect the performance of 
Chinese cross-border acquisitions. 
In the first part of my study, I conduct a literature review. I summarize the 
questions addressed by previous studies and analyze the topics that are less touched 
upon. Literature has documented that factors such as acquirer characteristics, offer 
price, and target stock run-up all have impacts on the merger outcomes. However, 
less is known about how the due diligence and integrations might affect the acquirer 
post-merger performance. This paper fills in this gap in the literature. In the context 
of cross-border acquisitions, I use proxies that related to the firms’ due diligence 
and integration process to examine how these factors are correlated with the merger 
performance.  
In the second part of this paper, I analyze five takeover cases, starting with 
three Chinese cross-border acquisitions. The first is Geely’s acquisition of Volvo, 
and the other two are acquisitions conducted by Everbright Securities Unit and 
Lenovo, respectively. These three cases were all conducted by Chinese acquirers. 
However, they differ substantially in their post-merger performance. In the case 
analyses, I examine the negotiation of these cases and analyze the characteristics of 
the acquirers and the targets. In addition to these Chinese cases, I study two U.S. 
deals—a cross-border acquisition conducted by Amazon and a domestic acquisition 
conducted by Microsoft. Through these case analyses, I identify several factors that 
are key to the success of cross-border acquisitions. One of the factors is the rigor 
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of the due diligence process during negotiation. With careful due diligence, the 
acquirer can more precisely evaluate a target. The second factor that affects the 
performance of a cross-border acquisition is the success of the post-merger 
integration. A few concerns emerge during the integration process, such as the 
organizations’ cultural differences, corporate structure changes, and 
communication issues. Acquirers that can quickly and smoothly complete the 
integration process gain more from their cross-border acquisitions. 
In the final part of my study, I conduct a series of empirical tests. As 
discussed in the case study section, due diligence and integration process are crucial 
to the success of cross-border acquisitions. I use the bidders’ oversea connections 
and director-level overseas experience as proxies to capture these two factors. 
Presumably, firms with more oversea connections have fewer cultural differences 
with the targets. They can communicate smoothly with the targets and experience 
fewer issues in corporate structure adjustments. In addition, those overseas 
experience (both at the corporate level and director level) can help the acquirer 
conduct careful due diligence and evaluate the target’s value more precisely.  
I collect data from the Securities Data Company (SDC) and China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases. I manually match the data 
according to the acquirers’ names. I test whether firms with oversea connections 
elicit a stronger market reaction and have better long-run post-merger performance. 
I use two proxies to measure acquirers’ oversea connections: director-level 
overseas experience and company-level overseas connections. I deem a director as 
having overseas experience if he has studied or worked abroad. If the acquirer firms 
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have businesses in overseas markets or have branches abroad, I define them as 
having company-level overseas connections. I find that markets react more 
favorably to cross-border deals with acquirers that have overseas experience. 
Furthermore, long-term performance is positively associated with deals in which 
acquirers have overseas experience. 
In the second part of the empirical study, I test whether the target nation 
affects the post-merger performance in the short term and the long term. The target 
nation can be a proxy of the motivation of the acquisitions. Targets in a developed 
country might possess more patents and high-tech equipment. Through these 
acquisitions, acquirers can obtain new technologies. On the other hand, when firms 
acquire targets in developing countries, it is more likely that they are motivated by 
obtaining resources or entering into new markets. 
The results indicate that the market reactions are better for deals with targets 
that are incorporated in more-developed countries. However, the long-term 
performance of the acquirer firms is not affected by the target’s nation of 
incorporation. Details on the data collection process and the empirical results can 
be found in Chapters 4 and 5. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I conduct a literature 
review on cross-border acquisitions. In Chapter 3, I analyze a few Chinese cross-
border cases and compare these cases with U.S. cross-border acquisitions. Chapter 
4 describes the data collection process and reports the summary statistics of my 
sample. Chapter 5 reports the empirical results, and Chapter 6 concludes the study.  
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2 Literature review 
M&As receive abundant research attention. Recent studies examine the 
post-acquisition performance of the targets and acquirers. These studies find that 
the long-run post-merger performance of the acquirer is affected by the target firm 
size (Dimson and Marsh, 1986). Fuller et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006) show 
that when firms acquire privately-held targets, the post-merger announcement 
returns are generally positive. However, some studies argue that the acquirer’s 
announcement returns are biased. First, investors do not have much information 
and only trade on their private information; thus, their trading behaviors are biased 
(Jiang et al., 2005). Another reason that post-merger announcement returns are 
biased is the lack of short selling (Miller, 1977). The cost of short selling is higher, 
and only a few investors conduct short selling. Thus, the market might be upward 
biased. 
2.1 Factors that affect post-merger performance 
What factors affect acquirers’ post-merger performance? This question is 
addressed in several studies. Laamanen and Keil (2008) find that a high rate of 
acquisitions and the variability of the rate are negatively related to performance. In 
addition, they find that the size of the acquirer, the scope of the acquisition, and the 
acquirer’s past takeover experience moderate the relationship. Capron (2016) 
shows that the timing of the acquisition is also important to the acquirer. Cosh et al. 
(2006) find that the board’s share ownership in the acquiring company can affect 
the takeover performance. They use a sample of 363 U.K. takeovers and find a 
strong relationship between takeover performance and CEO ownership. Target–
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acquirer connections also affect acquisition outcomes. For example, Cai and Sevilir 
(2012) find that when the acquirer and the target have a common director, acquirer 
announcement returns are significantly higher than those of deals without such 
connections. To explain the superior acquirer performance, the authors find that 
first-degree connected deals are associated with a lower premium, and second-
degree connected deals are associated with higher post-deal performance. 
Conversely, Ishii and Xuan (2014) find that M&As are more likely to take place 
among firms with (vs. without) social ties. What’s more, the social ties between 
acquirers and targets have a significant negative effect on the announcement returns 
of the acquirers and the combined firms. The existence of social ties is associated 
with a higher target board retention rate, a higher probability of the acquirer CEO 
receiving deal-related bonuses, and poorer post-deal performance. Renneboog and 
Zhao (2014) show how corporate networks affect the takeover process and find that 
well-connected firms (central firms) are more likely to become bidders compared 
to other firms. In addition, well-connected firms complete the deal in a shorter time. 
In addition, directors of connected targets have a higher probability of being 
retained. However, they find no impact of board connection on announcement 
returns. Schmidt (2015) studies the social ties between the CEO and board members 
and finds that the CEO–board connection has both benefits and costs to the firm. 
When the potential value of the board’s advice is high, social ties are associated 
with higher announcement returns. However, when monitoring needs are high, the 
social ties between the CEO and board members are associated with negative 
announcement returns. 
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2.2 Motivations of M&As 
Another line of studies focuses on the motivations of firms to conduct 
mergers and acquisitions. The literature documents that M&As are often value-
destroying, which raises the question of why firms conduct M&As (Goldberg, 
1983). According to the literature, one of the motivations is to gain control of the 
market. Studies document that after an acquisition, the combined firm gains 
significant control of the market (Jensen, 1984). In addition, studies show that 
opportunities for synergy emerge after M&As (Chatterjee, 1986; Lubatkin, 1983). 
The post-merger performance of cross-border acquisitions also differs from 
that of domestic takeovers. For example, Aw and Chatterjee (2004) find that U.K. 
firms acquiring large takeover targets are associated with negative cumulative 
abnormal returns over the test period. In addition, the performance of U.K. firms 
that take over U.S. targets is better than that of U.K. firms that take over EU targets. 
Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that corporate governance can affect firm value and 
merger outcomes. They show that the stronger the shareholder protection, the 
higher the premium in cross-border acquisitions relative to domestic acquisitions. 
2.3 Factors affecting acquirers’ stock performance 
One of the factors that affect acquirers’ stock performance is the offer price 
paid. The offer price of a deal is correlated with the target firm’s pre-announcement 
stock volatility. Since the 1980s, studies show that target firms’ stock prices 
experience a significant run-up before the merger announcement (Keown & 
Pinkerton, 1981; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Meulbroek, 1992; Schwert, 1996; 
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Chakravarty & McConnell, 1997; Meulbroek & Hart, 1997; King, 2009; Kedia & 
Zhou, 2014; Augustin et al., 2019). For example, in a sample of 1,814 target firms, 
Schwert (1996) finds that the average cumulative abnormal return two months 
before the merger announcement date is 13.3%. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 
document that the stock run-up effect exists for tender offer deals. Kedia and Zhou 
(2014) show that there are abnormal trading activities of the target’s corporate 
bonds and that the bond prices are correlated with the acquirer’s characteristics. 
Although studies agree on the existence of stock run-up before merger 
announcements, there are different views on what factors lead to the pre-
announcement run-up. Some researchers provide evidence that insider trading is 
the cause of the stock run-up. Using data on illegal trading from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Meulbroek (1992) shows that pre-announcement run-ups 
are due to insider trading. Kedia and Zhou (2014) find that the target’s corporate 
bond prices are correlated with the acquirer’s characteristics, which supports the 
insider trading explanation. Moreover, they find that affiliated dealers are more 
likely to participate in trades associated with higher returns and to sell more bonds 
that stand to lose. These findings suggest that there are information flows within 
financial institutions. King (2009) analyzes Canadian takeovers and finds evidence 
that insiders use private information to trade before the merger announcement. 
The acquirer firms’ characteristics also have impacts on post-merger 
performance. In particular, studies find that a firm’s risk-taking reflects the CEO’s 
life experiences, which affect corporate decision making (Roussanov & Savor, 
2014; Hutton et al., 2014; Benmelech & Frydman, 2015; Schoar & Zuo, 2013; 
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Malmendier et al., 2011). Relatedly, Malmendier and Tate (2008) conclude that the 
acquiring CEO’s propensity to pursue risky value-destroying acquisitions reflects 
his or her life and educational experiences that fuel overconfidence. 
2.4 Factors affecting targets’ stock performance 
For target firms, the private negotiation process might affect the deal 
outcomes and the target stock performance. The first question in the private 
negotiation process is what type of target or acquirer initiates the deal. Masulis and 
Simsir (2018) find that targets that have economic weaknesses or financial 
constraints are more likely to initiate M&A deals. Consistent with these findings, 
Fidrmuc and Xia (2017) report that firms with higher CEO ownership, larger golden 
parachutes, and higher stock options granted to the CEO are more likely to initiate 
deals. Aktas et al. (2016) find that acquirers with higher levels of CEO narcissism 
are more likely to conduct acquirer-initiated deals. Chen and Wang (2015) find that 
a target’s private information about its stand-alone value and a bidder’s private 
information about the valuation of the target firm are key factors determining the 
time of initiation. Whether the outcomes of target-initiated deals are different from 
those of acquirer-initiated deals is an interesting question worth examining. Masulis 
and Simsir (2018) find that for target-initiated deals, the takeover premium, target 
abnormal returns, and deal value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and 
amortization multiples are lower. Oler and Smith (2008) find that firms that make 
take-me-over announcements are more likely to underperform their peers. 
Another line of studies focuses on how a target sells its firm through 
negotiation or auction, and what factors affect the target’s choice of the selling 
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process. Xie (2010) finds that target-initiated deals are more likely to use auctions 
and acquirer-initiated deals are more likely to negotiate one on one. Schlingemann 
and Wu (2015) find that targets choose auctions to maximize the target takeover 
premium through greater competition and to relax their financial constraints. They 
also find that auctions are associated with higher target announcement returns. 
Anilowshi et al. (2008) study how target firms manage their earnings and their 
choice of selling method and find that firms that conduct earnings management are 
more likely than firms without earnings management strategies to sell their firms 
via auction. Another question is whether the selling method affects the deal 
outcomes. Boone and Mulherin (2007) find that the selling method does not affect 
deal outcomes. Why not? Chira and Volkov (2015) find that compared with firms 
with successful auctions and pure negotiations, firms with ex-ante auction failures 
are associated with lower final premiums and higher acquirer returns. Aktas et al. 
(2011) report latent competition among acquirers bidding in one-on-one 
negotiations. They also show that when the bid premium is high enough, it can be 
used to deter potential bidders. This result shows that there are costs related to the 
auction process. Boone and Mulherin (2008) find that the bidder’s announcement 
returns are not negatively correlated with the intensity of the takeover competition, 
which does not support the winners’ curse hypothesis. 
2.5 Literature review summary 
So far, I have reviewed M&As literature. From the above review, we can 
see that there are only a few studies that focus on cross-border acquisitions. Most 
of the studies examine the factors that affect domestic acquisitions. However, cross-
11 
 
border acquisitions possess different features from domestic acquisitions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate cross-border acquisitions separately from 
domestic acquisitions. Besides, less is known about how due diligence and cultural 
conflicts can affect the acquirers’ post-merger performance. This study fills in the 
gap in M&As literature by focusing on cross-border acquisitions and examine how 
due diligence and cultural conflicts affect the success of acquisitions.   
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3 Case study 
According to the SDC Platinum database, the number of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals significantly increased after 2000. However, cross-border 
acquisition in China is in the initial stage. Although the number of Chinese cross-
border acquisitions has continued to grow in recent years, the success rate of these 
cross-border deals is not high. Furthermore, Chinese firms face numerous 
challenges in the post-integration period. Therefore, it is crucial to examine a few 
typical cases to determine the factors that affect deal outcomes. Below, I conduct 
case analyses of three Chinese M&As (all cross-border) and two U.S. M&As (one 
domestic and one cross-border). I collected the detailed information of the M&As 
from the firm’s official websites, SEC filings, as well as news reports. From these 
case analyses, I summarize the factors that affect the deals’ post-merger 
performance. In the next two chapters, I support my conclusion with large-sample 
empirical analyses. 
3.1 Chinese cases 
Although the number of cross-border acquisitions has increased 
significantly, Chinese firms face a few challenges. One is the low announcement 
return. According to historical data, the market return on the announcement date of 
cross-border acquisitions is significantly lower than that of domestic takeovers. 
Another issue faced by Chinese firms is the low success rate of post-merger 
integration. Chinese enterprises often spend a lot of effort studying the market to 
predict price and demand. Firms should take more time to study the post-merger 
integration problem, as this aspect is something enterprises can control. Below, I 
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analyze three Chinese cases to gain a better understanding of firms’ strengths and 
weaknesses in the cross-border M&A process. 
3.1.1 The case of Geely and Volvo 
My case study starts with the takeover of Volvo by Geely. Through this 
acquisition, Geely obtained high-end technologies and new platforms. In addition, 
this takeover opened the foreign markets for Geely. 
(1) Case background 
On March 28, 2010, Geely announced that it would acquire 100% of 
Volvo’s shares for USD1.8 billion. Through this acquisition, Geely took over nine 
series of products, three new platforms, more than 2,400 global networks, talents, 
and brands, and an important supplier system. Five months later, on August 2, 2010, 
Geely completed the acquisition in London. Although this acquisition has since 
proven to be successful, things did not go well in the negotiation period. Before the 
two parties reached an agreement, there was fierce competition in the auction to 
acquire Volvo. Negotiating with Volvo was not easy.   
Established in 1986, Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co., Ltd. is one of the 
top 10 enterprises in China’s auto industry. After 18 years of construction and 
development, Geely performs well in the areas of automobiles, motorcycles, 
engines, gearboxes, and auto parts. In 2014, Geely’s total assets exceeded RMB20 
billion. 
The target firm, Volvo, is a famous Swedish company in the auto industry. 
Volvo cars are known as the safest in the world, and Volvo is the largest car 
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company in Northern Europe and the largest industrial conglomerate in Sweden. 
Before it was acquired by Geely, Volvo operated as a subsidiary of Ford after it had 
been acquired in 1999. 
Although acquiring Volvo was costly and risky for Geely, there were also 
several benefits. First, Geely obtained a few top-notch technologies in the auto field. 
The chairman of Geely mentioned that Geely was very keen to acquire the patents 
developed by Volvo. As an international brand, Volvo had not only valuable patents 
but also many skilled workers. After the acquisition, Geely had access to those 
patents. Second, acquiring Volvo increased the reputation of Geely’s brand. Before 
the acquisition, Geely was not well recognized in the foreign market and had no 
competitive power in the luxury car market. Geely expected to fix this shortcoming 
with the acquisition of the Volvo brand. Finally, the acquisition of Volvo helped 
Geely enter overseas markets. Geely can earn oversea market shares through this 
acquisition. However, after the acquisition, Geely could enter new markets with a 
well-known name. Therefore, comparing the pros and cons, the benefits of the 
takeover were greater than the costs for the acquiring firm. 
Between 2005 and the takeover in 2010, Volvo’s operating performance 
had been in decline. On average, its annual loss was about USD10 billion. 
Therefore, it was wise for Ford, Volvo’s parent company, to sell Volvo to avoid 
further losses. The selling process for Volvo was rather fierce. Geely was not a 
particularly strong competitor, but it was able to win the auction because it showed 
great respect for Volvo’s culture and management strategy. Geely’s chairman 
promised that after the acquisition, he would allow Volvo to operate as an 
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independent department and would give Volvo management teams the power to 
make decisions. Also, China is a market with lots of growth opportunities and many 
potential customers. Being acquired by Geely gave Volvo access to these 
advantages. 
Although the process of taking over Volvo was difficult, Geely’s post-
merger performance has been extremely good. The stock price increased by about 
106% after the merger announcement, and the long-term performance is positive. 
Based on the operational performance between 2013 and 2018, the post-merger 
integration was very smooth. For the whole year of 2014, Volvo Car Group’s global 
retail sales reached 465,866 units, much higher than in 2013, setting a new global 
sales record since 2007. It is also worth mentioning that in 2014, Volvo surpassed 
Lexus to become the fifth luxury car brand in the Chinese market. Volvo has a very 
good brand reputation within China’s market, and it is regarded as very safe by 
Chinese customers. Moreover, Geely showed great respect for Volvo’s 
management teams, which made the post-merger integration even smoother. 
(2) Case summary 
Looking into Volvo’s case, it is clear that the post-merger integration period 
was crucial to the success of the M&A. Although the competition process during 
the negotiation might lead the acquirer to offer a higher premium, with a smooth 
integration period, the acquirer can still gain from the takeover. To lower the 
probability of cultural conflicts and communication barriers, Geely allowed Volvo 
to operate independently after the integration. All of these actions improved the 
post-merger performance. 
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There were a few reasons for the smooth integration process. First, Geely 
devoted a lot of time in choosing suitable targets and conduct a careful due 
diligence. Before the negotiation started, Geely had already searched for potential 
partners to enter into overseas markets. Furthermore, to show Geely’s respect for 
Volvo, Geely’s chairman flew abroad several times to meet with Volvo’s 
management teams. Second, during the integration process, Geely try very hard to 
avoid cultural conflicts. Since the merger, Volvo has been led by its original 
management team. Geely does not interfere with all of the business decisions. 
Finally, the support of the government cannot be ignored. In recent years, more and 
more Chinese firms have conducted cross-border acquisitions. The Chinese 
government has launched a series of policies to help firms obtain more 
opportunities in the overseas market. For example, firms have more channels to 
finance acquisitions. All of these factors contribute to the favorable outcomes of 
Geely’s acquisition. 
3.1.2 The case of Everbright Securities Unit’s overseas acquisition 
(1) Case background 
Beginning in 2016, Everbright Securities Unit (Everbright) partnered with 
Beijing Baofeng Group Co. (Baofeng) to establish a fund targeted at acquiring 
overseas companies. They planned to acquire MP & Silva Limited. Based in 
London and founded by the Italian businessman Riccardo Silva, MP & Silva 
Limited was an international sports marketing and media rights company. In May 
2016, Everbright and Baofeng purchased 65% of MP & Silva’s stock. The 
acquisition was an important stepping stone for Baofeng to enter the sports industry.  
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To finish the acquisition, Everbright and Baofeng established the Jin Xin 
investment fund, and the acquisition was made through this strategic partnership. 
The total investment of the Jin Xin fund was about RMB5.2 billion, invested by 14 
partners. Among all of the partners, China Merchants Wealth Asset Management 
Limited, the largest limited partner, invested around RMB2.8 billion, about 53.82% 
of the total fund value. The total value invested by the priority investors was about 
RMB3.2 billion. 
However, three years after the acquisition, it was reported that MP & Silva 
had missed rights payments to entities such as the Premier League. Many entities 
cut their ties with MP & Silva after the agency had missed several scheduled rights 
fee payments and lost a host of big contracts in the months after it emerged that 
Serie A was set to take the company to court over unpaid rights fees totaling nearly 
EUR38 million. The final straw that crushed MP & Silva came from the French 
Tennis Federation (FFT). In October 2018, the FFT appealed to the High Court of 
Justice for the bankruptcy of MP & Silva under the Insolvency Act. 
The China Merchants Bank, together with other priority partners of the Jin 
Xin investment fund, filed a lawsuit against Everbright Capital for compensation 
of RMB3.489 billion. Although Everbright signed a contract to make up the 
difference in return for priority shares by inferior share subscribers, there is still 
dispute among the investors, and who should bear the loss remains unclear. 
(2) Case summary 
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Why did the acquisition of MP & Silva fail? The lack of due diligence seems 
partly responsible. As an acquirer, Everbright should have conducted thorough due 
diligence. However, Everbright did not carefully examine the past performance of 
MP & Silva, nor did it propose to use the important and commonly used valuation 
adjustment mechanism. At the time of the acquisition, most of the major sports 
copyrights owned by MP & Silva were close to expiry. Among them, the copyright 
contracts with Serie A and Ligue 1 were due to expire by 2018, and those with the 
Premier League, Arsenal FC, and F1 by 2019. The longest contract is up to 2021. 
The lack of continuity of copyright was a major concern after the acquisition by the 
Jin Xin investment fund. Such issues could and should have been examined during 
the due diligence process. With proper analysis, the fund would have been able to 
avoid acquiring relatively unattractive firms with little growth potential. 
In addition, after the acquisition, the fund did not sign a non-competition 
agreement with crucial employees of MP & Silva. As a result, the three founders 
of MP & Silva quit the company immediately after the acquisition, securing a huge 
amount of money. From August 2015, two of the founders, Radrizzani and Silva, 
started to reduce their shares in MP & Silva. Radrizzani founded Eleven Sports in 
2015, acquired several import broadcast rights, and after the acquisition, bought the 
British crown team Leeds United in 2017. Silva bought the American second-level 
professional football team Miami FC in 2017 and became a shareholder of the Serie 
A giant AC Milan in 2018. The actions of the two founders adversely affected the 
operations of MP & Silva after the acquisition. 
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Who should bear the loss? The value of MP & Silva dropped considerably, 
and in October 2018, after successive lawsuits, the British High Court declared MP 
& Silva in official bankruptcy liquidation. On March 13, 2019, the Jin Xin fund and 
its executive partner Everbright sued Baofeng Group in the High Court of Beijing. 
Due to the failure of this acquisition, Everbright and the other plaintiffs required 
Baofeng to make up the loss of approximately RMB750 million. 
3.1.3 Lenovo takeover of IBM PC 
(1) Case background 
In December 2004, Lenovo Group announced the acquisition of IBM’s PC 
business. In May 2005, the transaction was completed. The negotiations between 
Lenovo and IBM began in 2003 and lasted for about one year. At the end of 2003, 
Lenovo began the due diligence process and hired McKinsey as its strategic 
consultant to gain a comprehensive understanding of IBM’s PC business and 
integration possibilities. In early 2004, Lenovo hired Goldman Sachs as its financial 
advisor. On March 26, 2004, Lenovo and IBM began substantive negotiations. The 
negotiations were conducted with a confidential agreement. During the negotiations, 
the two parties reached an agreement, and subsequently announced an acquisition 
agreement on December 8, 2004. After the merger, Lenovo would have access to 
IBM’s entire PC business, including its notebook and desktop businesses. Lenovo 
acquired the PC business’s global sales channels, R&D centers in Japan and North 
Carolina, and 10,000 employees. The transaction consideration was about USD650 
million in cash, and Lenovo’s stock was worth about USD600 million. The total 
consideration was up to USD1.25 billion. 
20 
 
After the transaction, Lenovo and IBM established long-term strategic 
partnerships. Lenovo received five years’ free use of the IBM brand and ownership 
of related patents of the ThinkPad brand. Lenovo was the preferred supplier of 
IBM’s PC equipment, and the IBM Global Service Center became Lenovo’s 
priority service provider. Besides, IBM Global Financial Service became the 
preferred provider of Lenovo’s financial leasing and financial services. 
After the acquisition, IBM and Lenovo formed a unique marketing and 
service alliance, and Lenovo’s PCs were sold through IBM’s worldwide 
distribution network, which allowed Lenovo to enter more worldwide markets. 
IBM continued to provide a variety of integrated IT solutions for small and 
medium-sized business customers. IBM was the preferred maintenance and quality 
assurance service and financing service provider for the new Lenovo. 
(2) Case summary 
To summarize the success of Lenovo’s acquisition, I start by analyzing 
Lenovo’s negotiation process. Next, I explain what Lenovo did to achieve an 
effective post-merger integration. 
Unlike Everbright, Lenovo conducted thorough due diligence throughout 
the negotiation process, which ensured that the merger was completed smoothly. 
The due diligence conducted by Lenovo included verifying procurement data and 
business information. Lenovo hired a third-party accounting firm to verify the 
information through a review of the relevant procurement contracts, to check the 
accounts, and to spot check the bills. Due to the neutrality of the third party, the 
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concerns of IBM were alleviated. Lenovo paid a reasonable fee to those third party, 
reflecting its great confidence in the transaction. 
To achieve the effective integration after the merger, Lenovo devoted a lot 
of effort to reduce the conflicts between the two parties. Lenovo adopted dual-brand 
and dual-market tactics to maintain the temporary stability during the post-merger 
period, rather than rushing to integrate. Lenovo introduced the concept of “candid 
respect and compromise.” Compromise was the key for Lenovo and IBM when 
identifying the most important tasks after integration. Through this way, the two 
parties gradually arrived at the best resolution and avoided the cultural conflicts.  
3.2 U.S. cases 
In the following analyses, I focus on a cross-border acquisition conducted 
by a U.S. company and a U.S. domestic acquisition. I compare these two cases with 
the acquisitions conducted by Chinese firms discussed in the previous sections. 
3.2.1 Amazon’s takeover of Joyo 
(1) Case background 
Joyo.com (Joyo) was established in 2000. Specializing in popular products 
such as audio and video, books, software, games, and gifts, Joyo rapidly grew into 
an influential e-commerce website in China. In January 2000, Joyo spun off from 
Beijing Jinshan Software Co., Ltd. Jinshan Company and Legend Investment Co., 
top IT companies in China, jointly invested in the newly formed Joyo. Later, in 
September 2003, the world-famous investment institution Tiger Fund became the 
third largest shareholder of Joyo.  
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On the other side of the world, Amazon is a key player in the e-commerce 
sector in the U.S. market and is one of the NASDAQ 100’s index stocks. Before 
Amazon took over Joyo, it already had six websites around the world selling a 
variety of products. Amazon offers new products and refurbished goods in 
categories such as clothing, shoes, apparel, home gardening, outdoor products, 
baby products, jewelry and watches, books, kitchen utensils, cameras, magazine 
subscriptions, mobile phones and services, music, computers, and other accessories. 
Amazon also sells products on other companies’ websites through store 
collaboration. Before taking over Joyo, Amazon already had 7,800 employees. 
Although Amazon was willing to enter the Chinese market, it faced fierce 
competition with local online shopping companies, such as dangdang.com. In early 
2004, Amazon approached dangdang.com and Joyo in private to negotiate a 
potential integration. However, dangdang.com rejected Amazon’s offer. During the 
second round of negotiations, Amazon only negotiated with Joyo about the 
possibility of a merger. In April 2004, Amazon and Joyo took the merger to the 
next stage and started to discuss the terms and concessions of the deal. Later, they 
reached a merger agreement with a final offer price of about USD75 million. 
Amazon acquired 100% of Joyo’s stock, with 95% of the consideration paid in cash. 
The merger announcement was made on August 19, 2004. The U.S. and 
Chinese markets had different opinions on this integration. Many Chinese investors 
thought that the consideration was less than Joyo was worth, and that Amazon 
would gain from this acquisition. However, U.S. investors did not agree that the 
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acquisition can bring Amazon more value. On the announcement date, Amazon 
stock opened at USD40.34 per share, but the price dropped later that day. 
Amazon’s post-merger performance in China was not successful. Joyo.com 
did not increase its sales in mainland China, nor did it bring other profit to Amazon. 
Compared with other e-commercial platforms, like Dangdang.com, Tmall, and 
JD.com, Joyo has little market share and its sales are decreasing. 
(2) Case summary 
One reason for the failure of Amazon’s acquisition is its lack of localization. 
In the second year after the acquisition, Amazon made a major overhaul of Joyo. 
The layout style was completely changed to emulate Amazon’s, and a global 
unified model was adopted to save costs. In China, Amazon–Joyo was more like a 
department with no decision-making functions, instead of an operation center. 
However, China’s culture differs a lot from that of the U.S. For example, in China, 
there are lots of special holidays, such as Chinese New Year and November 11. The 
failure to adjust to the local market meant Amazon had difficulty competing with 
local online shopping companies. In recent years, the number of employees has 
dropped by around 50%. However, Amazon has recently realized the importance 
of localization and has changed its strategies in the Chinese market. It has opened 
a new business in year 2014, “overseas purchase,” which allows local customers to 
buy products manufactured outside China. The breakthrough of overseas purchase 
allowed Amazon to see its potential to sell products at a lower cost. At the end of 
October 2016, Amazon’s special Prime membership service was added to China’s 
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special terms to provide Prime membership customers with cross-border orders 
with unlimited free shipping throughout the year. 
The case of Amazon shows the importance of integration. Although 
Amazon started with a takeover of a local company, integrating and adjusting to 
the local market were crucial to its entrance into new markets. However, in 
domestic acquisitions, localization is not an important factor that determines the 
success of the merger—rather, competing with other potential bidders and 
identifying synergies are. 
3.2.2 Microsoft’s takeover of LinkedIn 
(1) Case background 
LinkedIn is the world’s largest professional network website, and its 
members use the platform to stay connected. It also provides opportunities for its 
members to advance their careers. The LinkedIn board regularly evaluates 
LinkedIn’s strategic direction and ongoing business plans with a view to realizing 
LinkedIn’s vision and mission, strengthening its core business, and enhancing 
stockholder value. As part of this evaluation, the LinkedIn board had considered a 
variety of strategic alternatives, including (1) the continuation of LinkedIn’s current 
business plan as a standalone entity; (2) modifications to LinkedIn’s business plan 
and strategy; and (3) potential expansion opportunities into new business lines 
through acquisitions and combinations of LinkedIn with other businesses. 
On February 16, 2016, LinkedIn’s CEO met with Microsoft’s CEO to 
discuss their ongoing commercial relationship and ways to enhance it. During the 
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discussion, the concept of a business combination was raised. Apart from Microsoft, 
LinkedIn had discussed business combinations with a few other potential acquirers, 
such as Google, Facebook, and Salesforce, that were also interested in LinkedIn. 
During the negotiation period, the LinkedIn board authorized the company to 
engage Qatalyst Partners as its financial advisor to assist with its exploration of 
alternative strategic transactions. 
On April 6, 2016, representatives of Wilson Sonsini, LinkedIn’s outside 
legal counsel, provided Microsoft with a draft of a confidentiality agreement. The 
confidentiality agreement was signed on April 11, 2016. On May 13, 2016, 
Microsoft submitted a revised proposal in response to the request for best and final 
offers for the acquisition of LinkedIn at USD182 per share in cash, with the 
flexibility to include Microsoft common stock as part of the consideration mix if 
requested by LinkedIn. Another company had submitted a bid for USD182 per 
share, consisting of USD85 in cash and the remainder in that company’s stock. On 
June 6, 2016, Microsoft’s proposal of USD182 in cash per share of LinkedIn 
common stock was no longer feasible and Microsoft was encouraged to offer 
USD200 per share. Mr. Weiner, the CEO of LinkedIn, informed the members of 
the Transactions Committee that he had spoken to Mr. Hoffman, co-founder and 
executive chairman of LinkedIn, and he was now also supportive of the acquisition 
of LinkedIn entirely in the form of cash, in addition to the proposal of a cash and 
stock transaction. The representatives of Qatalyst Partners discussed with the 
Transactions Committee that an acquisition entirely for cash would be more 
attractive to Microsoft.  
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On June 11, 2016, the representatives of Qatalyst Partners, Allen, and 
Wilson Sonsini reviewed the terms of the merger agreement and Microsoft’s 
proposal for an acquisition of LinkedIn at USD196 per share in cash. Later that day, 
LinkedIn informed Microsoft that the LinkedIn Board had approved the acquisition, 
and the merger agreement was signed.  
From the bidding process, we can see that the bidding competition was quite 
fierce. One of the potential problems associated with fierce bidding competition is 
that the winner might overpay. Boone and Mulherin (2008) suggest that the 
breakeven returns to bidders in corporate takeovers stem from the competitive 
market for targets. Therefore, in domestic acquisitions, bidders may face the 
problem of high market competition. 
(2) Case summary 
Is the takeover of LinkedIn successful? The answer is still unknown because 
the acquisition took place not long ago. However, the deal seems to have paid off 
so far, as LinkedIn has generated more than USD5 billion in annual revenue and 
this number is still growing. In addition, LinkedIn’s well-connected chairman Reid 
Hoffman can help Microsoft, which has not been very well connected in Silicon 
Valley, build stronger connections. So far, the post-merger integration process has 
been smooth in the year following the acquisition. 
3.3 Conclusions from the case analyses 
From the cases analyzed, we can see that there are many differences 
between domestic acquisitions and cross-border acquisitions. Bidders in cross-
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border acquisitions must focus not only on the pre-bidding competition but also on 
the post-merger integration. The integration process is more challenging for cross-
border acquisitions because the bidders might be less familiar with overseas 
markets, industry trends are hard to predict, and communication between the targets 
and the acquisition might not be very smooth due to cultural differences.  
Several factors determine the success of cross-border acquisitions. One of 
the factors is due diligence when evaluating the value of the target firm. The 
evaluation process is not simply about the price. The evaluation should also 
concentrate on the future developments of the target firm and the industry, contracts 
such as copyrights and patents, brand value, etc. For example, if Everbright and 
Baofeng had devoted more time to the due diligence process, they might have been 
able to avoid the losses. Obtaining intellectual assets and patents is crucial to the 
success of a cross-border acquisition. However, the evaluation process is more 
complicated for cross-border than domestic acquisitions, and the industry trend is 
hard to forecast because of the acquirer’s unfamiliarity with overseas markets. 
Another factor that affects the performance of a cross-border acquisition is 
the effectiveness of the post-merger integration. Comparing the cases above, we 
can see that the post-merger integration can affect the operation and decisions of 
the merged entity. Geely’s success depended a lot on its respect for Volvo’s culture 
and the management team’s ability. However, failing to adapt to the Chinese market 
and controlling too much of Joyo surely damaged Amazon’s operating performance. 
The bidder needs to pay attention to several aspects of the post-merger integration. 
First, some independence might be good for the target firm’s operation. In cross-
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border acquisitions, the target firms need to adapt to the local market. Therefore, 
too much control from the bidder might lower the efficiency of the target firm’s 
operating process. Second, acquisitions’ success also depends on the bidder’s use 
of the target’s resources. With valuable patents and connections, the acquisition can 
bring the bidder more than what can be found in the balance sheets. Last but not 
least, maintaining a good reputation for the target’s brand is also important. Volvo’s 
good reputation in China contributed a lot to the success of Geely’s acquisition. 
To verify the conclusions drawn from the case analysis, in the empirical part 
I test whether overseas experience and the target’s nationality can affect the merger 
outcomes. I focus on the acquirer’s overseas experience and the target’s nationality 
for the following reasons.  
First, acquirers with overseas experience are more likely to conduct 
thorough due diligence before the two parties reach an agreement. The overseas 
experience of board members can help the acquirer to better communicate with the 
target during the negotiation process. Through such conversations, acquirers can 
obtain valuable information that allows them to better evaluate the target. Besides, 
thorough due diligence can lower the probability of acquiring worthless assets. 
Second, the overseas experience of board members can also help to smooth 
out the integration process after the merger. Cultural differences and 
communication problems often lead to less successful post-merger performance. 
Board members with overseas experience can act as a bridge to help the two parties 
better understand each other. 
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I also examine whether the target’s nationality affects post-merger 
performance. Targets with different cultures might experience different post-
merger integration processes that affect merger performance. There are many 
differences between developed countries and developing countries, such as in legal 
systems, customer preferences, and market competition. On the one hand, acquirer 
firms in developed countries allow the bidder to obtain advanced technology. Such 
technologies allow the bidder to produce high-end products and gain more market 
share. On the other hand, the cultural differences between mainland China and 
developed countries are significant. These cultural differences might be reflected 
in daily communication between the two merger parties. Misunderstandings, a lack 
of communication, and differences in working hours can all contribute to low 
efficiency. The two management teams might behave differently and cause 
unnecessary costs to the combined company. Therefore, in this paper, I use the 
target’s nationality as a proxy of the target culture to test its effect on integration 
performance.  
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4 Data and research methodology 
4.1 Data and sample selection 
I use cross-border M&A data from the SDC database. My sample is from 
January 1990 to January 2016. I start from 1990 because before 1990, only a few 
Chinese cross-border deals took place. The number of Chinese cross-border deals 
started to increase after 1990. I collect data on all deals in which the acquirers were 
Chinese mainland companies. Next, I require the acquirer firm’s state of 
incorporation to be mainland China (omitting firms incorporated in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Macau). In addition, I drop deals in which the target firms were 
incorporated in mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau. I retain only 
deals whose status is either “Completed” or “Withdrawn.” Furthermore, I require 
the number of shares acquired to be larger than 50% of the target’s total shares. 
Deal characteristics, such as deal size and deal premium, are obtained from 
the SDC database. I drop deals with incomplete deal characteristics and deals with 
missing target and acquirer firm characteristics. For the acquirer characteristics, I 
manually match the SDC and CSMAR data using the company name. The matching 
process is as follows. First, I manually search for the company name in the SDC 
database in English and translate this name into Chinese. Then, I check whether the 
firm is listed. Last, for listed firms I obtain the corresponding stock codes from their 
official websites. 
I also collect the firms’ financial information and stock trading information 
from the CSMAR database. With the collected firm stock codes, I obtain the firms’ 
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characteristics from the CSMAR database. I drop deals for which the target firms’ 
characteristics are missing. 
My final sample comprises 1,641 deals with non-missing deal information. 
Among them, 512 were conducted by listed acquirers. Merging the information 
with that of the CSMAR database yields 227 deals with Chinese listed acquirers 
with stock trading information. The number of deals with stock trading information 
is much smaller than that of public acquirers in my sample, as some of the firms 
were listed outside mainland China and other stock trading information had fewer 
than 50 data points one year before the deal announcement. 
In addition, I manually collect the acquirers’ overseas experience. To 
measure overseas experience, I use two proxies—the acquirer board members’ 
overseas experience and the acquirer’s overseas connections. Acquirer board 
members are defined as having overseas experience if they have studied or worked 
abroad. An acquirer is deemed to have an overseas connection if it has entered an 
overseas market or established branches in an overseas market. Board member 
information and overseas information are obtained for 67 of the 227 deals. This 
information is collected from the firms’ annual reports and their official websites. 
Table 1 reports the deal number by year from the SDC database and my 
sample. From Table 1 we can see that the deal number increased year by year. After 
2000, cross-border acquisitions conducted by Chinese firms increased dramatically. 
On average, there were only six deals per year before 2000. The deal number was 
significantly lower during the first few years at the beginning of the 1990s. There 
were 20 deals at the beginning of 2000. However, hundreds of cross-border deals 
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have taken place in recent years. The data show that Chinese firms have started to 
conduct more acquisitions. The number of cross-border deals increased from 2 
deals per year in 1990 to 142 in 2017. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
I remove deals with missing variables, reducing my sample size. I drop 
deals whose status is not “Completed” or was “Withdrawn.” The number of the 
acquirer’s shares is required to be larger than 50% of the target firm’s total shares. 
After deleting deals with missing values, I have 1,461 cases of Chinese acquirers’ 
conducting cross-border deals. As shown in Table 1, Columns (2) and (3), 512 deals 
were conducted by listed acquirers and 949 deals were conducted by private 
acquirers. We can see from Columns (2) and (3) that in the 1990s there were only 
a few cross-border deals conducted by public acquirers. Cross-border deals 
conducted by public acquirers increased significantly after 2001. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 show the characteristics of the listed acquirers. 
Column (4) reports the number of deals with acquirers listed in mainland China. 
Column (5) reports the number of deals with acquirers listed in markets outside 
mainland China. Column (6) shows the number of deals with cross-listed acquirers. 
From these three columns, we see that before 2010, acquirers listed overseas 
conducted more cross-border mergers and acquisitions. However, after 2010, 
Chinese listed firms increased their acquisition activities overseas. The number 
increased dramatically after 2013, and in the last three years, the number of cross-
border acquisitions conducted by Chinese listed firms exceeded the sum of the 
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cross-border acquisitions conducted by overseas listed firms. This phenomenon 
might be correlated with the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the summary statistics of Chinese cross-border 
M&A deals according to acquirer overseas experience. Column (1) of Panel A 
reports the total number of deals for which data on overseas experience are 
available. Column (2) of Panel A reports the number of deals for which board 
members have overseas experience. Column (3) presents the number of acquirers 
with overseas connections. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, of the 67 deals for which the firm’s board 
and director information is available, 38 acquirers have board members with 
overseas experience and 27 acquirers have overseas connections.  
Panel B of Table 2 presents the number of Chinese cross-border M&A deals 
by the target nation. Column (1) of Panel B reports the total number of deals. 
Column (2) presents the total number of cross-border deals conducted by listed 
acquirers. Column (3) reports the total number of cross-border deals with private 
acquirers. 
From Panel B of Table 2, we can see that Chinese acquirers are more likely 
to acquire firms in North America and Europe. The countries in these two 
continents are more developed, and the firms are more mature. Acquisitions of 
firms in these two areas are likely driven by the desire to obtain high-end 
technology. For these deals, post-merger integration is crucial to the success of an 
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M&A deal. Two factors might affect the acquirers’ post-merger integration. First, 
obtaining advanced technology might be risky. Although the products are advanced, 
they might not be suitable for the mainland market. How to use those technologies 
in the acquirer’s firm might be a key factor affecting post-merger performance. 
Second, the cultural differences between mainland China and North America, and 
between mainland China and Europe, are very large. These cultural differences 
might be reflected in the daily communication between the two merger parties. 
Misunderstandings, a lack of communication, and differences in working hours can 
all contribute to low efficiency. The two management teams might behave 
differently and incur unnecessary costs for the combined company. 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of acquirer characteristics and deal 
characteristics. Column (1) to column (5) reports the variables’ mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value respectively. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Measure of firm performance 
In this paper, I use short-term measurements and long-term measurements 
of post-merger performance. Short-term measurements reflect market reactions to 
the merger announcement. This measure indicates the market’s opinion of the 
cross-border M&A deal. I also use the acquirer firm’s long-term performance after 
the deal to examine post-merger integration. 
(1) Short-term firm performance 
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In this paper, I use 3-day, 5-day, 11-day, and 23-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR [-1, 1], CAR [-2, 2], CAR [-5, 5], and CAR [-1, 21] respectively) to 
measure the acquirer’s market performance. Abnormal returns are calculated using 
the market model. I use the acquirer’s stock price from 365 days before the 
announcement date to 60 days before the announcement date to estimate the market 
model. I drop deals with fewer than 50 trading data points within the stated period. 
The market model is calculated using the formula below: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖                               (1) 
(2) Long-term firm performance 
I measure the post-merger performance of the acquirer using the acquirer’s 
ROA one year (two years) after the merger announcement, and its earnings per 
share one year (two years) after the merger announcement. ROA is calculated as 
earnings before interest and tax divided by the acquirer’s total assets. 
I also measure the acquirer’s post-merger long-term performance by using 
its long-term stock performance. To measure the long-term post-merger 
performance, I calculate the stock returns one year (180 days) after the merger 
announcement. I use Model (2) to calculate the stock return: 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 (180 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠) 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
− 1                    (2) 
4.2.2 Regression model 
I also examine the factors that affect cross-border post-merger performance 
by using linear regression. My model is shown in Equation (3). The dependent 
variable of Model (3) is the post-merger performance of the acquirer firm, either 
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short term or long term. The independent variables are the deal and firm 
characteristics. I add year fixed effects to control the variation of M&A 
performance each year: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋2𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                     (3) 
 𝑋2𝑖 stands for the control variables and 𝜎𝑖 stands for the unobserved year specific 
effects. I use two acquirer firm characteristics as control variables in all of the 
regressions: “Acquirer total assets” and “Acquirer leverages.” “Acquirer total 
assets” is the total book value of assets at the beginning of the year, and “Acquirer 
leverages” is calculated as the debt to asset ratio of the acquirer. 
The two key factors in this study are overseas experience and target 
nationality. These two measures are highly correlated with the target due diligence 
process and cultural conflicts. Overseas experience is measured at two levels, firm-
level and director-level. Overseas experience can capture the acquirer’s familiarity 
with the target as well as the foreign market. Those experiences enable firms to 
better evaluate targets. Firms with overseas experience are comparatively familiar 
with the economic environment in the target nation. Besides, firms with overseas 
experience have less information asymmetry, which allows the acquirer to offer a 
proper merger premium. In addition, in the post-merger integration process, firms 
with overseas experience can reduce the cultural conflicts between the acquirers 
and targets.  The overseas experience of the director allows the firms have more 
foreign connections. Besides, directors’ overseas experience can guide them better 
communicate and negotiate with their counterparties. On the other hand, target 
nationality can capture the motivation of the acquisition, which can affect the due 
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diligence process and cultural conflicts. Target in developed countries might have 
a lower information asymmetry level, which allows the acquirer to better evaluate 
the target. However, they might face a complex economic environment and law 
system, which might require the acquirer to spend more time in the due diligence 
process. The different motivation for acquisition also affects the post-merger 
integration process. In the following test, I use these two proxies to examine how 
they affect the deal characteristics and post-merger performance. 
5 Empirical tests 
5.1 Post-merger performance 
As discussed above, I will focus on the acquirer overseas experience and 
the target nationality in my empirical tests. Overseas experience is important to the 
firms’ due diligence before the merger announcement while the target nationality 
reflects the merger motivation. 
I first test whether the deal outcome is significantly different between those 
with overseas experience and those without. According to the previous analysis, 
firms with overseas experience should be more familiar with the targets and able to 
better evaluate the target’s true value. Besides, when directors have overseas 
experience, acquirers are likely to be more familiar with the culture of the target 
and thus communicate more smoothly with the target firm’s management team. 
These factors all contribute to the success of the post-merger performance. In the 
following tests, I examine both short-term market reactions and long-term post-
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merger acquirer performance to analyze the effect of acquirers and director 
overseas experience. 
In the second part of Chapter 5, I examine whether the area of target 
incorporation affects the acquirer firm’s market reactions and post-merger 
integration. The target’s nationality of incorporation can affect the economic 
environment the acquirer might face and the laws that the acquirer might be subject 
to. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the target’s nationality of incorporation 
can affect the deal’s outcome and the acquirer’s long-term performance. In the 
following test, to measure the short-term performance and the market reaction to 
the deal announcement, I use CAR, which is calculated from the 365 days before 
the announcement date to 60 days before the announcement date. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
As shown in Table 4, on average, the market reactions to deals with overseas 
experience and overseas connections are better than those to deals without overseas 
experience. This finding is consistent with my conjecture that overseas experience 
is positively correlated with the performance. It is also consistent with the 
conclusions of the case analyses in Chapter 3. Therefore, the empirical findings are 
consistent with those of the case analyses. 
Several channels can explain the results of Table 4. First, acquirers with 
more overseas experience are less likely to face high information asymmetry during 
the due diligence process. Less information asymmetry lowers the risk the acquirer 
might be subject to during the acquisition. Furthermore, deals that might present 
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obstacles in the post-merger integration period can be avoided in the negotiation 
process if the acquirer is acquainted with the target’s culture. The second channel 
that may drive my results is that overseas experience can help firms to find more 
suitable outside advisors. With the help of experienced outside advisors, firms can 
better evaluate the target and avoid overbidding. The acquirer firm’s overseas 
business and other connections have similar functions in helping the firm approach 
targets that can generate high synergies. 
Table 5 presents the market reactions to announcements of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals according to the target’s nation of incorporation. Columns (1) 
to (4) present the results of the market reactions to merger announcements for 
targets located in a developed continent with window periods of [-1, 1], [-2, 2], [-
5, 5], and [-1, 21] respectively. I adjust for year fixed effects for all the regressions. 
In Table 5, the main variable of interest is whether the target is incorporated 
in developed countries. The variable “Target incorporated in developed area” is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the target firm is incorporated in North America or 
Europe. Otherwise, the variable for a target incorporated in a developed area equals 
0. I control for acquirer size and leverage in the regression. As shown in Table 6, 
the targets incorporated in developed areas are associated with higher market 
reactions. The results are consistent within all four window periods. On average, if 
targets are incorporated in a developed area, the market reactions are 3% higher 
than for deals in which the targets are not. As shown in the table, acquirer size and 
acquirer leverage are not significantly correlated with the market reactions. This 
result is inconsistent with previous research (Moeller et al., 2004; Capron & Pistre, 
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2002). One of the probable reasons is that my sample is relatively small. There are 
only 227 data points in my sample. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results in Table 5 reflect market opinions to the acquisitions. In general, 
shareholders are more favorable toward deals with targets incorporated in 
developed countries. This might be due to the higher probability that these firms 
possess advanced technologies and efficient management teams. Targets 
incorporated in less developed areas might have fewer patents or advanced products. 
Such acquired assets might be subject to higher uncertainty if the targets are 
incorporated in developing areas. In addition, the legal systems in developed areas 
are more robust and might bring more certainty to the acquirers, also contributing 
to the positive market reactions to the merger announcement. Overall, the results in 
Table 6 reflect shareholders’ opinions on Chinese firms’ acquisitions. 
In the following two tables, I test how the long-term post-merger 
performance varies according to the acquirer’s overseas experience and the target’s 
nation of incorporation. I use ROA and stock returns to measure long-term 
performance. Detailed calculations can be found in Chapter 4. 
Table 6 presents the long-term market reactions to the deal announcements 
of Chinese cross-border M&A deals according to the acquirer’s board members’ 
overseas experience and the acquirer’s overseas connections. The variable of 
interest is board members’ overseas experience and the acquirer’s overseas 
experience. Columns (1) and (3) report the ROA one year after the merger 
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announcement. Columns (2) and (4) report the ROA two years after the merger 
announcement.  
As shown in Table 6, the acquirer’s overseas experience is associated with 
higher post-merger performance. The post-merger one-year ROA and the post-
merger two-year ROA are significantly higher when the acquirers possess overseas 
experience. These results are consistent with the conclusions of the previous case 
analyses. Acquirers with overseas experience can communicate more smoothly 
with the target firm after the merger. Better integration generates higher synergy. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The findings in Table 6 are not surprising. Overseas experience is valuable 
in the post-merger integration process. First, cultural differences are shown to be 
one of the reasons for the failure of post-merger integration. Overseas experience 
can mitigate the effects of cultural differences. With more knowledge of the target 
culture, communication can be smoother, and fewer misunderstandings might 
occur. Second, overseas experience can also help the acquirer firms set a proper 
goal in the target market. To open the overseas market, localization is crucial. As 
shown in the case of Amazon, an inappropriate goal might lead to unexpected losses. 
Finally, overseas experience also correlates with more overseas connections, which 
are valuable in the merger markets (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Ishii & Xuan, 2014). 
Table 7 presents the market reactions to the announcements of Chinese 
cross-border M&A deals according to the target’s nation of incorporation. The 
dependent variable is the target’s nation of incorporation, which is a dummy 
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variable that equals 1 if the target is incorporated in a developed area. Column (1) 
reports the ROA one year after the merger announcement, and Column (2) reports 
the ROA two years after the merger announcement. I adjust for year fixed effects 
in all of the regressions. ROA is calculated as the acquirer’s earnings before interest 
and tax, divided by the total assets. The sample includes 202 data points with non-
missing acquirer characteristics and stock trading information. 
As shown in Table 7, the long-term post-merger performance of the Chinese 
acquirers is not significantly correlated with the target’s nation of incorporation, 
although Table 5 shows that the market reactions differ for deals with targets 
incorporated in developed countries. Long-term operating performance is 
correlated with post-merger integration. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results in Table 7 can be interpreted as follows: when taking over a 
corporation in a less developed area, firms might be subject to negative market 
opinions. However, these negative market reactions are not rational in terms of 
long-term post-merger performance. Statistically, there is no significant difference 
in performance between acquirers that takeover targets in developed versus 
developing countries. This result indicates that the market might have biases in 
some of the cross-border takeovers. 
Table 8 shows the long-term stock performance after the cross-border deal 
announcement. The stock’s long-term performance is calculated using Equation (2) 
in Chapter 4. The stock prices one year after the deal announcement are collected 
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from the SDC database. Consistent with the long-term operating performance 
(ROA), the long-term stock performance is not correlated with the target’s nation 
of incorporation. Similar to the results in Table 7, these results show that whether 
takeover targets are in developed nations or developing nations does not affect the 
long-run performance. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5.2 Deal characteristics performance 
In this section, I examine how overseas experience and the target firm’s 
nation of incorporation affect merger deal characteristics. Table 9 presents the 
correlation between the adoption of termination fees and acquirer overseas 
experience. In addition, this table reports the association between the adoption of 
termination fees and the target’s nation of incorporation. Columns (1) to (3) present 
the results of the adoption of target termination fees. Columns (4) to (6) present the 
results of acquirer termination fees. I control for the acquirer’s total assets and 
leverage. The t-statistics are in parentheses. I adjust for year fixed effects for all of 
the regressions. 
As shown in Table 9, the board members’ overseas experience and the 
bidder’s overseas connections are not correlated with the adoption of termination 
fees. However, the results in Table 9 indicate that targets incorporated in developed 
countries are more likely to adopt termination fees and ask the acquirers to adopt 
termination fees. Two factors might contribute to this result. First, targets in well-
developed countries are generally larger and the structures of the target firms are 
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more complicated. Therefore, the adoption of termination fees can cover the cost 
of due diligence and other opportunity costs that might occur if the acquirer or the 
target decides not to go through with the merger. Second, targets in well-developed 
countries are exposed to more merger opportunities. The adoption of termination 
fees can lower the chances that a target withdraws from the merger negotiation and 
turns to other potential acquirers that can offer better merger terms. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
The adoption of termination fee agreements also benefits the target. For 
targets, merging with foreign firms might be less uncertain than being acquired by 
domestic firms. These uncertainties might arise from cultural differences, market 
misfits, or complicated corporate structures. The termination agreements adopted 
by the acquirer firms lower the target firms’ uncertainty and can help transactions 
complete faster and more smoothly. 
Finally, I test how overseas experience and the target’s nation of 
incorporation affect the deal characteristics. Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 
10 show the correlation between the bidder’s overseas experience and the deal 
status and payment methods. Columns (3) and (6) of Table 10 show the correlation 
between the target’s nation of incorporation and the deal status and payment 
methods. I control for the acquirer’s total assets and leverage and adjust for year 
fixed effects for all of the regressions. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
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The results of Table 10 indicate that deal characteristics such as completion 
rate and payment method are not affected by acquirers with overseas experience. 
As shown in Table 10, the deal completion rate is not affected by the target’s nation 
of incorporation. This result is very interesting, because one might expect the 
completion rate of deals with overseas experience or targets incorporated in 
developed countries to be higher. Targets incorporated in developed countries 
might have more experience in M&A and can engage advisors with better 
reputations. However, results are not consistent with this view. One possible reason 
is that the cultural differences between Chinese acquirers and targets in well-
developed countries are large. These differences might present more difficulties in 
the negotiation period and the integration process. Therefore, when a Chinese 
acquirer is faced with two similar targets, the one located in Europe or North 
America might be more associated with greater difficulties in the takeover process. 
Another finding in Table 10 shows that the payment methods of the deal are 
not correlated with overseas experience or the target’s nation of incorporation. 
Studies have shown that the payment method of the deal might be affected by the 
target firm’s information asymmetry level. On average, firms in well-developed 
areas have less information asymmetry. However, our results are not consistent 
with this view, although this might be due to the small sample size of this study. 
Another possible explanation is that although the firms are financially transparent, 
the differences in culture, language, and working hours all hinder the 
communication process and lead to a higher information asymmetry level. 
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Overall, my empirical results indicate that acquiring targets that are 
incorporated in a well-developed area might benefit the acquirer in the short run, as 
reflected in the short-term market reactions. However, long-run operating 
performance and long-term stock performance do not vary with the target’s nation 
of incorporation. In addition, our results show that deal characteristics are similar 
for deals with targets in developed and developing areas, except in the adoption of 
termination fees. Cross-border acquisitions have slight differences compared to 
domestic acquisitions regarding deal terms. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I study the factors that affect cross-border acquisitions’ post-
merger performance and deal characteristics. I start my research with a few case 
studies. I analyze Chinese cross-border acquisitions and compare them with U.S. 
deals. In addition, I examine one domestic acquisition and compare it with cross-
border acquisitions conducted by Chinese acquirers. 
In the case studies, I find that due diligence during the negotiation process 
and the success of post-merger integration are crucial to the M&A deal. During the 
negotiation period, the acquirer must not only evaluate the value of the target, but 
also pay more attention to the target’s patent, its brand value, and the local market. 
After the merger announcement, whether the acquirer can communicate smoothly 
with the target management team is important to the success of the merger. The 
success of the acquisition also depends on the bidder’s use of the target’s resources. 
In the second part of this paper, I use empirical data to examine Chinese 
cross-border acquisitions. The results show that the acquirer firm’s short-term and 
long-term post-merger performance is affected by the acquirer’s overseas 
experience. My results show that firms with overseas experience have stronger 
market reactions to the deal announcement. In addition, the long-term performance 
is higher for acquirers with overseas experience. 
Moreover, I test whether deal performance is affected by the target’s nation 
of incorporation. Specifically, I find that the market reacts more favorably to cross-
border deals with targets incorporated in more developed countries. In addition, the 
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deals that involve targets incorporated in more developed countries also have 
superior deal outcomes. However, long-term performance is not affected by the 
target’s nation of incorporation.  
My study has some limitations. One concern about my study is that I only 
focus on the target firms’ nationality. Due to data limitations, I cannot control for 
other target firm characteristics. Target characteristics are shown to be correlated 
with the deal characteristics and the acquirer firm’s post-merger performance. 
However, in my sample, some of the target firms are not public firms, and their 
financial information is not publicly available. In addition, some target firm 
characteristics can affect the merger negotiation process. A larger or complicated 
target firm might be associated with a longer negotiation period. Other factors, such 
as target and acquirer connections and the use of financial advisors, can also affect 
the post-merger performance. Therefore, future research should focus on these 
factors and test whether and how these factors affect Chinese cross-border 
acquisitions’ post-merger performance. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): Cumulative abnormal returns to the merger 
announcement. Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model (as shown in 
Equation (1)). To calculate the market model, I use the acquirer’s stock price in the 
window period [-365, -60] before the merger announcement. Firms with fewer than 50 data 
points are dropped. 
ROA: Earnings before interest and tax divided by the total assets at the beginning of the 
year.  
Earnings per share: Earnings per share of the focal year.  
Long-term post-M&A stock returns: The stock returns one year (180 days) after the 
merger announcement. This variable is calculated using Equation (2). 
Acquirer total assets: The natural logarithm of the total book value of assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
Acquirer leverages: The debt to equity ratio of the acquirer. 
Target incorporated in developed area: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 if the 
target is incorporated in North America or Europe. 
Director with overseas experience: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 if the 
acquirer’s board of directors has overseas experience and 0 otherwise. 
Acquirer with overseas connections: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 if 
the acquirer has entered an overseas market or established branches in an overseas 
market. 
55 
 
Target/Acquirer termination fees: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 if the 
target or acquirer adopts a breakup fee provision. 
Completed deal: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 for deals that are 
completed and 0 for deals that are withdrawn.  
Cash deal: Dummy variable. This variable equals 1 if the deal considerations are 
paid 100% in cash. 
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Appendix B 
Table 1 Number of cross-border deals from China by year 
This table presents the summary statistics of M&A deals that took place in each 
year. Column (1) reports the total number of cross-border merger and acquisition 
deals in each year. Column (2) presents the total number of cross-border deals 
conducted by listed acquirers. Column (3) reports the total number of cross-border 
deals conducted by private acquirers. Columns (4) to (6) show the number of deals 
conducted by each type of listed acquirers in each year in my sample. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year 
Total 
cross-
border 
deals 
Listed 
acquirers 
Private 
acquirers 
Listed in 
mainland 
China 
Listed in markets 
outside China 
Cross-
listed 
firms 
1990 2 0 2 0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 7 3 4 1 2 0 
1993 9 2 7 0 1 1 
1994 5 0 5 0 0 0 
1995 4 0 4 0 0 0 
1996 5 2 3 1 0 1 
1997 9 0 9 0 0 0 
1998 9 0 9 0 0 0 
1999 7 2 5 0 1 1 
2000 6 0 6 0 0 0 
2001 11 2 9 1 0 1 
2002 24 9 15 3 5 1 
2003 6 1 5 1 0 0 
2004 24 12 12 7 4 1 
2005 35 8 27 3 5 0 
2006 35 12 23 2 6 4 
2007 58 14 44 5 8 1 
2008 68 28 40 8 18 2 
2009 77 24 53 9 12 3 
2010 86 21 65 10 10 1 
2011 101 24 77 16 5 3 
2012 95 33 62 20 11 2 
2013 80 37 43 24 11 2 
2014 130 43 87 19 22 2 
2015 184 81 103 54 25 2 
2016 242 108 134 77 23 8 
2017 142 46 96 33 13 0 
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Table 2 Acquirer’s overseas experience and target nationality 
This table presents the summary statistics of Chinese cross-border M&A deals 
according to the acquirer’s overseas experience and target nationality. Panel A 
reports the statistics of overseas experience. Column (1) reports the total number of 
deals for which information on overseas experience can be collected. Column (2) 
reports the number of deals that involve board members who have overseas 
experience. Column (3) presents the number of acquirers that have overseas 
connections. Panel B focus on target nationality. Column (1) reports the total 
number of deals. Column (2) presents the total number of cross-border deals 
conducted by listed acquirers. Column (3) reports the total number of cross-border 
deals conducted by private acquirers.  
Panel A: Overseas experience 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 Total cross-
border deals 
Board members 
with overseas 
experience 
Acquirers that 
have overseas 
connections 
Number of deals that have information  67 38 27 
 
 Panel B: Target nationality 
  
Total cross-
border deals 
Listed 
acquirers 
Private 
acquirers 
Africa 43 10 33 
Asia 259 78 181 
Europe 517 182 335 
North America 461 181 280 
Oceania 139 41 98 
South America 42 20 22 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of acquirer characteristics and deal 
characteristics. Column (1) to column (5) reports the variables’ N, Mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 N Mean Median Std Dev. Min Max 
Acquirer total assets 227 23.095 22.517 2.286 19.579 30.815 
Acquirer leverage 227 -0.056 0.899 1.111 -16.714 0.164 
CAR [-1, 1] (%) 227 1.257 0.695 6.795 -59.450 27.110 
CAR [-2, 2] (%) 227 0.785 0.535 9.791 -96.635 35.119 
ROA after one year 202 0.028 0.039 0.123 -1.016 0.182 
ROA after two years 155 0.072 0.035 0.495 -0.718 6.109 
Stock performance after 180 days 187 -0.030 -0.090 0.352 -0.816 1.401 
Stock performance after one year 187 -0.040 -0.121 0.511 -0.863 2.655 
Target termination fees 227 0.018 0.000 0.132 0.000 1.000 
Acquirer termination fees 227 0.009 0.000 0.094 0.000 1.000 
Completed deal 227 0.912 1.000 0.284 0.000 1.000 
Cash deal 227 0.203 0.000 0.403 0.000 1.000 
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Table 4 Market reactions to cross-border deal announcements 
and overseas experience 
This table presents the market reactions to deal announcements of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals according to the acquirer’s directors’ overseas experience and 
the acquirer’s overseas connections. Columns (1) and (2) present the relationship 
between the acquirer market reactions to merger announcements and director 
overseas experience. Columns (3) and (4) report the relationship between the 
acquirer market reactions to merger announcements and acquirer overseas 
experience.  
 CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 [-1, 1] [-2, 2] [-1, 1] [-2, 2] 
Directors with overseas experience 1.423* 2.210*   
 (1.66) (1.83)   
Acquirer with overseas connections   1.989* 2.133 
   (1.78) (1.16) 
Acquirer total assets -0.092 -0.110 0.081 0.124 
 (-0.50) (-0.18) (0.30) (0.33) 
Acquirer leverage -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.011 
  (-0.43) (0.06) (-0.66) (-0.60) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 67 67 67 67 
R2 0.101 0.078 0.061 0.129 
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Table 5 Market reactions to cross-border deal announcements 
and target’s nationality 
This table presents the market reactions to deal announcements of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals according to target nations. Columns (1) to (4) present the 
results of the market reactions to merger announcements for targets located in a 
developed continent with window periods of [-1, 1], [-2, 2], [-5, 5], and [-1, 21] 
respectively. I adjust for year fixed effects in all of the regressions. 
 CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 [-1, 1] [-2, 2] [-5, 5] [-1, 21] 
Target incorporated in developed countries 2.483** 3.040** 6.341** 11.083** 
 (2.38) (2.00) (2.30) (2.15) 
Acquirer total assets -0.107 0.010 0.276 0.281 
 (-0.52) (0.03) (0.51) (0.28) 
Acquirer leverage -0.002 0.000 -0.009 -0.015 
  (-0.41) (0.06) (-0.68) (-0.61) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 227 227 227 227 
R2 0.113 0.096 0.062 0.079 
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Table 6 Post-merger accounting performance to cross-border 
deal announcement and overseas connections 
This table presents the post-merger accounting performance of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals according to the acquirer’s board members’ overseas experience 
and the acquirer’s overseas connections. The independent variable of interest is 
directors with overseas experience. Columns (1) and (3) report the results for ROA 
one year after the merger announcement. Columns (2) and (4) report the results for 
ROA two years after the merger announcement.  
 
ROA after 
one year 
ROA after 
two years 
ROA after 
one year 
ROA after 
two years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Director with overseas experience 0.009 0.015   
 (1.21) (1.61)   
Acquirer with overseas connections   0.009* -0.013* 
   (1.78) (-1.66) 
ROA one year before merger -1.113 1.125 0.378 0.45 
 (-0.32) (0.14) (0.98) (0.32) 
Acquirer total assets -0.002 0.007* -0.001 0.003* 
 (-0.41) (1.67) (-1.08) (1.77) 
Acquirer leverage 0.002*** -0.003*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
  (3.36) (-3.11) (4.12) (-2.89) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 61 61 61 61 
R2 0.091 0.173 0.211 0.136 
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Table 7 Post-merger performance to cross-border deal 
announcement 
This table presents the market reactions to deal announcements of Chinese cross-
border M&A deals according to target nation. The main independent variable is the 
target’s nation of incorporation. Column (1) reports the results for ROA one year 
after the merger announcement. Column (2) reports the results for ROA two years 
after the merger announcement. I adjust for year fixed effects in all of the 
regressions. 
 ROA after one year ROA after two years 
 (1) (2) 
Target incorporated in developed countries 0.005 -0.017 
 (0.27) (-0.73) 
ROA one year before merger -1.536 1.201 
 (-1.45) (1.14) 
Acquirer total assets 0.003 0.010* 
 (0.64) (1.79) 
Acquirer leverage -0.004 -0.009** 
  (-1.23) (-2.19) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 202 155 
R2 0.099 0.975 
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Table 8 Stock performance to cross-border deal 
announcement 
This table presents the long-term post-merger stock performance to the deal 
announcement of Chinese cross-border M&A deals according to target nation. The 
main independent variable is the target’s nation of incorporation. Column (1) 
reports the results for the post-merger stock performance for 180 trading days. 
Column (2) reports the results for the stock performance for one year. I adjust for 
year fixed effects in all of the regressions. 
 (1) (2) 
 
Stock performance 
after 180 days 
Stock performance after 
one year 
Target incorporated in developed countries -0.035 -0.034 
 (-0.63) (-0.44) 
Acquirer total assets -0.006 0.003 
 (-0.63) (0.21) 
Acquirer leverage -0.000 0.000 
  (-0.51) (0.24) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 187 187 
R2 0.259 0.328 
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Table 9 Adoption of termination fees 
This table presents the correlation between the adoption of termination fees and the 
target’s nation of incorporation. Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the results of the 
adoption of target termination fees, and Columns (4), (5), and (6) present the 
acquirer termination fee results. The main independent variables are “director with 
overseas experience,” “acquirer with overseas experience,” and “Target 
incorporated in developed countries.” I control for the acquirer’s total assets and 
leverage. I adjust for year fixed effects in all of the regressions. 
 Target termination fees  Acquirer termination fees 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Director with overseas experience 0.072    0.102   
 (1.29)    (1.44)   
Acquirer with overseas connections  -0.012    0.052  
  (-0.31)    (0.21)  
Target incorporated in developed countries   0.047**    0.030** 
   (2.29)    (2.12) 
Acquirer total assets 0.003* 0.004* 0.007*  0.002* 0.006* 0.005* 
 (1.72) (1.66) (1.70)  (1.77) (1.81) (1.96) 
Acquirer leverage -0.001 -0.001 -0.000  -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.31) (-0.972) (-0.42)  (-0.31) (-0.97) (-0.44) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 60 60 227  60 60 227 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.087 0.092  0.135 0.072 0.142 
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Table 10 Other deal characteristics 
This table presents the correlation between deal characteristics and the target’s 
nation of incorporation. Columns (1)-(3) ((4)-(6)) show the correlation between the 
target’s nation of incorporation and deal status (payment methods). The main 
independent variable is the target’s nation of incorporation. I control for the 
acquirer’s total assets and leverage. I adjust for year fixed effects in all of the 
regressions. 
 Completed deal   Cash deal 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Director with overseas 
experience 
0.035    0.056   
 (1.01)    (0.99)   
Acquirer with overseas 
connections 
 0.102    0.112  
  (0.81)    (0.27)  
Target incorporated in 
developed countries 
  0.028    -0.036 
   (0.63)    (-0.59) 
Acquirer total assets 0.001 0.002 0.000  0.002 0.005 0.000 
 (1.33) (1.63) (0.63)  (1.42) (1.21) (1.12) 
Acquirer leverage -0.001** -0.001*** 0.001***  0.002 0.001 0.000 
  (-2.12) (2.76) (2.83)  (1.32) (0.82) (0.08) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 60 60 227  60 60 227 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.066 0.114  0.102 0.165 0.123 
 
 
 
 
